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MAKING GIFTS FROM AN INCOMPETENT'S ESTATE
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTITUTION OF
JUDGMENT TO REDUCE FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES
INTRODUCTION
Query- May the guardian of an incompetent distribute assets from
the incompetent's estate through the medium of inter vivos gifts, solely
for the purpose of reducing federal estate taxes?' During the past decade
this question has been litigated in several jurisdictions.2 In most in-
stances, the inquiry has arisen when guardians of sizable estates ' have
sought to effectuate estate plans for the incompetent which would
maximize tax benefits4 to the estate, in keeping with the guardian's recog-
nized duty to manage the estate prudently "
By utilizing a novel application of the doctrine of substitution of
1. The tax advantages to be realized by making such gifts may be stated as follows:
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, non-charitable gratuitous transfers are
taxed. However, the tax rates for inter vivos transfers are lower than the rates for
testamentary transfers. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2001, 2502. A reduction of the
estate during life through inter vivos transfers, taxed at the more favorable rate, will
reduce the taxable estate passing at death and thereby minimize the estate tax so that
the donees or legatees receive the largest possible amount from the estate of their
benefactor. (The theory is that since the gift tax and estate rates are graduated, a gift
of part of the property inter vivos and a part testamentarily will result in the donee
receiving more than by giving all the estate to him testamentarily.) Even if gratuitous
inter vivos transfers should be found to be includable m the gross estate through the
operation of section 2035, (bringing transfers made in contemplation of death into the
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes), the gift taxes previously paid pursuant
to section 2502 would be credited toward the estate tax liability under section 2001,
although at a diminishing rate. Id. § 2012. An additional advantage is that the gross
estate recapture under section 2035 would not include the amount of the gift taxes
paid under section 2501. For a more thorough analysis of these interrelationships see
C. LowNDvs & R. KRAMER, FERAL. ESTATE AND G= TAxEs §§ 5.13, 38.1-47.12 (2d ed.
1962); Sharpe, A Guide to Gifts in Contemplation of Death, 1 P-H SuccEssstn ESTATE
PLANNING IDEAS AND METHODS T 2007.1 (1968). For the applicability of section 2035
to recapture see City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594 (1945); 11
VIa. L. Rxv. 150, 157 (1965).
2. Courts in New York, Delaware, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, California, Texas,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire have confronted the issue.
3. In most cases, the size of the estate has ranged from $160,000 in In re Morris,
N.H. -, 281 A.2d 156 (1971), to $176,000,000 in In re duPont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d
309 (Ch. 1963).
4. See text accompanying note 13 infra.
5. For an analysis of the management duties of a guardian, see 39 C.J.S. Guardian
and Ward § 76 (1944).
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judgment,' the law of guardianship has been broadened to allow the
Probate Court to authorize7 distributions from estates of incompetents
for tax purposes. This Note will place particular emphasis on non-
charitable distributions rather than on charitable gifts,8 since new
interpretations have had a greater impact in the non-charitable context,
and controversy still exists in this area.
HISTORY OF THE DoCTRIN OF SUBST ON OF JUDGMENT
The doctrine of substitution of judgment originated in the English
Chancery case of Ex Parte Whitbread,9 in which impoverished collateral
kinsmen 0 of the incompetent petitioned the court"' to grant allowances
for their support from the surplus income 2 of the ward's estate. In
granting such allowances the court reasoned: -
The Court does nothing wantonly or unnecessarily to alter the
Lunatic's property, but on the contrary takes care, for his sake,
that, if he recovers, he shall find his estate as nearly as possible
in the same condition as he left it, applying the property in the
mean time m such manner as the Court thinks it would have been
wise and prudent in the Lunatic himself to apply it, in case he had
been capable.
..... [I]t is not because the parties are next of kin of the Lunatic,
or, as such, have any right to an allowance, but because .the Court
will not refuse to do, for the benefit of the Lunatic, that which
it is probable the Lunatic himself would have done.13
6.'Succinctly- stated, the doctrine of substitution of judgment permits the court
to exercise its discretion in making distributions from the incompetent's estate which
the incompetent would have made himself had he the capacity to act. It is based on the
theoiy that the incompetent is a ward of the court and 'therefore the court must act
in his stead.
7. For an analysis of the supervisory powers of the court, see 39 CJ.S. Guardian and
Ward § 4 (1944).
8. For. a general overview of. charitable contributions which are permissible under
the doctrine of substitution of judgment, see Annot., 99 AL.R.2d 946 (1965).
9. 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816); see In re Darling, 39 Ch. D. 208, 213 (1888); In re Earl
of Carysfort, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (1840).
10. Collateral kinsmen are those who descend 'from the same common ancestor, but
ndt from ohe another.
11. Lord Eldon's opening paragraph indicates that the court has jurisdiction over
the incompetent's property. 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
12. Surplus income is that --income in excess of the amount r.quired for the cgre,
suppoit andmaintenance.of-the incompetent.
13. 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
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The basic criterion espoused in Whtbread seems to require a show-
ing that the incompetent would have disposed of his estate in a similar
fashion had he been of sound mind.' 4
The English doctrine first found acceptance by American courts in
New York15 and New Jersey.16 American and English courts shared
the fundamental conviction that equity had inherent jurisdiction over
the person and property of the incompetent.17 Exercising this jurisdic-
tion, courts in subsequent decisions have clarified and expanded the
Wbtbread theory of substitution of judgment.
Several jurisdictions have adopted the Whatbread theory through a
broad interpretation of existing statutory language, notwithstanding the
absence of specific legislative reference to the doctrine.'8 In contrast,
Massachusetts' 9 and Maryland" incorporated the doctrine by amend-
ments of existing probate codes. In Pennsylvania, the application of
the doctrine was regulated by statute,2' while in California the courts'
inherent jurisdiction was legislatively affirmed.22 Clearly, a substantial
number of jurisdictions2 s now recognmze that the Whitbread doctrine
provides the Probate Court with the latitude necessary to deal provi-
dently with the estate of the incompetent.24 It is important to note,
however, that the doctrine of substitution of judgment has been re-
jected in some jurisdictions, including Rhode Island and Texas.25
14. For the basis of the doctrine's "intent" requirement, see note 6, supra.
15. See, e.g., In re Heeney, 2 Barb. 326 (N.Y. Ch. 1847); In re Willoughby, 11
Paige's Ch. 257 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d
234 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1940); In re Flagler, 126 Misc. 764, 214 N.Y.S. 631 (Sup. Jud. Ct.
1926).
16. See, e.g., Potter v. Berry, 53 NJ.Eq. 151, 32 A. 259 (Ct. Err. & App. 1895); In re
Johnson, Ill N.J.Eq. 268, 162 A. 96 (Ch. 1932).
17. 35 Eng. Rep. 878.
18. See, e.g., In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943);
Sheneman v. Manning, 152 Kan. 780, 107 P.2d 741 (1940); In re Bucdey's Estate, 330
Mich. 102, 47 N.W.2d 33 (1951); State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 154,
113 S.W.2d 143 (1938).
19. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 201, S 38 (1958), as amended, ch. 422 (Supp. 1969).
20. MD. ANN. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 135A (Cum. Supp. 1963).
21. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 3644 (1969).
22. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1558 (West 1957).
23. For a general discussion of jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine, see
Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 863 (1969).
24. See note 7 supra.
25. See, e.g., Binney v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 43 R.I. 222, 110 A. 615 (1920);
In re Estate of Neal, 406 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd per curiam, 407 S.W.2d
770 (Tex. 1966).
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APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE FOR TAx PURPOSES
Early Acceptance
Although Whitbread and its progeny established the principle that
a guardian could expend estate funds for purposes other than the main-
tenance of the incompetent, it was not clear whether such expenditures
could be made for the sole purpose of avoiding excessive estate taxes.
The earliest case in a modern line of decisions dealing with this question
was In re Carson.26 There, the executor of the deceased incompetent
petitioned the court to vacate its previous order authorizing gifts from
the principal of the incompetent's estate to her son and daughter. Ini-
tially, the court recognized the doctrine of substitution of judgment:
[I]n a proceeding of this character, the court itself is called
upon, in legal theory, to don the mental mande of the incompetent
and 'direct the committee to act in behalf of the incompetent in
accordance with what the court finds would, in all probability,
have been the choice of the incompetent if [she] had been of sound
mind.' 2 7
The court accordingly upheld its previous order authorizing gifts from
the corpus of the incompetent's estate to her son for the purpose 'of
saving estate taxes. However, it denied allowance to the daughter, even
though the gifts were a mere duplication of the incompetent's estate
plan, because a reservation clause in the will withheld such disposition
until a later date.2
Having accepted'the will as an expression of the incompetent's intent,
the court apparently felt constrained to accept it in its entirety and
therefore refused to contravene the testator's clearly intended limita-
tions concerning the legacy of her daughter.
The court based its decision on the following findings: (a) the in-
competent was in extremis (she died seven days after the initial orders
authorizing the gifts); (b) the incompetent's intent was manifest from
her will; (c) the remaining assets of her estate were sufficient to
generate enough income for her support and care; and (d) there were
denionstrable savings in taxes and administration expenses.29
26. 39 Misc. 2d 544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1962).
27. 241 N.Y.S.2d at 289, quoting from In re Hills' Will, 264 N.Y. 349, 353-54, 191
N.W. 12, 14 (1934).
28. 241 N.Y.S.2d at 290. The reservation clause withheld disposition of the daughter's
legacy until she reached 40 years of age.
29. 241 N.Y.S.2d at 288.
1972]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
From these findings the court concluded:
To say that this incompetent, if sane, would not have given the
same direction this court gave would completely overlook the un-
derlying motive for the very instrument which gave life to these
executors.
To do otherwise would lead to a result increasing estate costs to
a point hardly consistent with our modern concept of estate plan-
rng for tax and other legitimate estate benefits.80
Shortly after Carson, a Delaware court similarly permitted non-chari-
table distributions (gifts by way of an inter vivos trust) to be made
from the incompetents estate. In In re duPont,ui the distribution was
permitted on the following grounds: (a) The incompetent's condition
was permanent; (b) If the distribution had been effectuated in the
ward's lifetime, significant tax savings would have resulted; (c) The
ward intended to make such distributions prior to his incompetency; (d)
The distributions would duplicate the ward's testamentary plan; and (e)
The property remaining in the ward's estate would be sufficient to
maintain the incompetent in the manner to-which he was accustomed. 2
In response to a jurisdictional challenge, the court concluded:
The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over the property of
aged, mentally infirm, and physically incapacitated persons is con-
ferred by [state statute]. While the Court of Chancery has long
asserted jurisdiction over the persons and property of the mentally
ill, it is -generally agreed that such jurisdiction is derived solely
from legislatve enactments.33
The court then concluded that the pertinent statutes 4 clothed it
with broad powers of supervision over the estates of incompetents:
In 12 Del. C. § 3710 the legislature of this state gave recogmtion
to the principle announced in Ex parte Whitbread in empowering
the Court of Chancery to authorize chaitable contributions from
-30. 241 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
31. 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194. A.2d 309" (Ch. 1963).
32. Id.
33. 194 A.2d at 312. The court referred to DEL. CODE ANN. Ut. 12, § 3914 ,(1953),
"ivhich gives the court:broad discreton m the appointment of guardians of an incompe-
tent's property once the nonce and hearing requirements are fulfilled.
34. Dr. CODE ANw. ut. 12 §§ 3701, 3705, 3710, 3914 (1953). -
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the income of an incompetent's estate. Sub-section (c) of § 3710
expressly provides that that section shall not be construed as abridg-
ing the existing powers of the Court over the estates of such per-
sons.35
After reviewing WhItbread and distinguishing prior Delaware law;
the court found that "under [ftate statutes] this court is empowered to
invoke the so-called substitution of )udgment doctrine here." 86
Thlis, Carson and duPont independently develbped s 7 the following
common criteria for evaluation before authorizing distributions, for tax
purposes, that would duplicate the incompetent's estate plan: perman-
ency of the incompetent's condition; intent; sufficiency of the remaining
estate to support the incompetent; and demonstrable tax savings.
In In re Kenan,88 the guardian sought authorization to make certain
gifts to charities for tax purposes. The court concluded that such
authorization could be granted only if it could be proved that the in-
competent would have made the gifts himself if he were of sound
mind."0 On second appea °40 the- North Carolina Supreme Court found
from the evidence that: (a) It was improbable that the -incompetent
would recover; (b) The incompetent had executed a will, evidencing
testamentary intent and, therefore, the enhancement :of legacies was a
consistent purpose; (c) The proposed donees, some of whom were
charitable, were proper; (d) The incompetent probably would have
taken such action if not incapacitated; (e) The gifts wohld realize con-
siderable tax savings; and (f) The remaining estate. as. sufficient to
provide for the incompetent's support and future needs.4 Thus, the
North Carolina Supreme Court utilized the Carson-duPfont criteria to
invoke the doctrine of substitution of judgment in affirming the lower
court's order granting such allowances.
35..194A.2dat316.
36. 194 A.2d at 317 The court referred to sections 3705 and 3914 (d).
57. DuPont, which succeeded Carson, does not cite Carson. Rather, the duPont
court formulated its reasoning from earlier New York authority.
38. 261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1964).
39. Id. at 9, 134 S.E.2d 91, holding that the petitioner failed to meet the burden
of proof necessary to make such gifts. Leave to amend was also granted. The court
stated: "A court may authorize a fiduciary to make a gift of a part of the estate of
an incompetent only on a finding, on a preponderance of the evidnce, at a hearing of
which interested parties have notice, that the lunatic, if then of -sound mind, would
make the gift." Id.
40. 262 N.C.627, 138 SY.2d547 .(1-964).
41. Id.
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Denial of the Doctrine's Extension to Tax Considerations
Two decisions, Bullock's Estate42 and In re Estate of Neal,43 have
rejected the use of the doctrine of substitution of judgment to effectuate
tax savings for the estate of an incompetent. Bullock, often cited as the
principal opposing authority,44 was overruled by a subsequent decision
which applied the doctrine to grant tax-saving distributions.45 Neal has
been distinguished or rejected by the courts of other jurisdictions. 46
Imtially, the Pennsylvania court in Bullock rejected an application by
the incompetent's wife, the sole beneficiary in hIs will, for payments to
herself and two daughters for the purpose of reducing future inheri-
tance and estate taxes. Basing the rejection on lack of statutory authori-
ty, the court stated: "In any event, incompetence is not the legal
equivalent of death, and tax avoidance is not a sufficient legal ground
for the intestate distribution of any part of an incompetent's estate
while he is putatively testate and actually alive." 47
However, In re Groff's Estate'8 recognized the applicability of the
doctrine in Pennsylvama and employed it to authorize gifts from the
incompetent's estate to reduce estate taxes, notwithstanding Bullock.
The Groff court interpreted § 3644 of the Pennsylvania Incompetent's
Estate Act" to be a limitation on the distributive powers of a guardian,
but found: "[N]othmg is expressly stated there or elsewhere in the
act to circumscribe the power of the court." 10 The decision dis-
tinguished Bullock and concluded that the substitution of judgment
doctrine should be applied by the court to permit the proposed gifts
in order to effectuate a sound estate plan.5
The Pennsylvania result leaves Texas as the sole jurisdiction to have
42. i0 Pa. D. & C.2d 682 (Orphan's Cr. Del. County 1957).
43. 406 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) It is probable that Rhode Island also
would deny tax-saving distributions. See Binney v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co.,
43 R.I. 222, 110 A. 615 (1920). Those jurisdictions that have accepted the doctrine of
substitution of judgment probably would employ it to allow such distribution.
44. See, e.g., In re Christiansen, 248 Cal. App.2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Ct. App.
1967).
45. In re GrofFs Estate, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 556 (Orphan's Ct. Montg. County 1965).
- 46. In re Christiansen, 248 Cal. App.2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Ct. App. 1967).
47. 10 Pa. D. & C.2d at 685.
-,48. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 556.
49. PA. STAT. Ut. 50, § 3644 (1969).
50. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 569.
51. The Groff court noted that the doctrine of substitution of judgment was not
considered in Bullock and that there was meager evidence supporting the grant of
such gifts, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 568.
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specifically denied employment of the Whztbread doctrine to reduce
estate taxes. The Texas Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Nea52 de-
nied an application to transfer trust property to the incompetent's heirs,
even when approval of the transfer would have duplicated the testa-
mentary plan of the incompetent. The court reasoned:
The enactment of Section 398 of the Probate Code would not
have been necessary if the Probate Court could have exercised the
power granted therein without such enactment. Moreover, such
section sets out in detail the conditions under which the charitable
gift may be made, and would seem to negative the doctrine of sub-
stitution of judgment. It is our view that this section of the Pro-
bate Code strongly indicates the legislative intent to confer upon
the court a power and authority, which it was believed the court
did not have prior to such enactment, namely, to make gifts out
of the income from the Ward's estate.
We have found notung in the Probate Code or the Statutes of
this State expressly or impliedly conferring upon the court the
power and authority to make a gift such as that proposed by appel-
lant.. 3
The Cbristiansen Criteria
The most progressive application of the doctrine of substitution -of
judgment to permit distributions from an incompetent's estate based
solely on tax considerations is In re Christiansen."4 There the incom-
petent's son, as guardian of the estate, appealed from an order denying
his petition to make gifts to the incompetent's children and grandchildren
from the corpus of the estate. The purpose of such gifts was to reduce
"the burden of excessive taxes against the estate and to permit enjoyment
of the property of the incompetent by her family during her lifetime." 11
In Chrstiansen, the incompetent had no will.
The California court's analysis of the problem was thorough. After
tracing the common law development of the doctrine of substitution of
judgment, relevant statutory provisions were analyzed and the court
concluded:
[T]he courts of this state, in probate proceedings for the ad-
ministration of the estates of insane or incompetent persons, have
52. 406 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
53. ld. at 502.
54. 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Ct. App. 1967).
55. 56 Cal. Rptr. at507.
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power and -athority to determine whether to authorize transfers
of the property of the incompetent for the purpose of avoiding
unnecessary estate or inheritance taxes or expenses of administra-
non, and to authorize such action where it appears from all the cir-
cumstances that the ward, if sane, as a reasonably prudent man,
would so plan his estate, there being no substantial evidence of a
contrary intent. 0
In addition, the court promulgated criteria for the proper exercise of
trial court discretionY.7 These criteria included: permanency of condi-
tion;58 needs of the ward; devolution of the property; 6° and donative
56. 56 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23 (emphasis supplied). In so holding, the California court
adopted the reasoning of the Carson, duPont, and Kenan decisions. Opposing views
espoused m Bullock and Neat were specifically rejected.
57. 56 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
58. 56 Cal. Rptr: at 523. This criterion requires:
.[Tlhe proof must show that the insanity is incurable before the court
can authorize a gift or transfer.... The necessity for permanency of con-
dition may also vary in inverse proportion to the sufficiency of the evidence
of the practice or custom of the incompetent, i.e., keeping up an establish-
ed weekly contribution to a church or a planned series of gifts for tax
avoidance.
59. Id. This requires:
The payment of the ward's debts and the satisfaction of the obligations
for the support of the ward and those who, as members of his family,
are entitled to support from his estate, m an amount not disproportionate
to the value of his estate and his station in life. No thought can be given
to transfer for any purpose until these obligations are met.
60. 56 Cal. Rptr. at 524:
Since on recovery the incompetent would be free to make or change
his will, no transfers should be authorized for tax saving purposes alone
unless there fs no probability of this eventuality
Where there is a will, the incompetent has furnished evidence of the
objects of his bounty, and the manner in which he wishes them to share
in his estate... Where the testator's wish demonstrates that a legacy is
to be delayed, it may be given effect by denial of the gift, as in the case
of that to the daughter in Carson.
In the instant case the discrepancies between gift and inheritance need
not necessarily be fatal if all other circumstances were present. In the
exercise of itsdiscretion the court could accept or reject the proposition
that the members of the first generation were not only the natural, but the
actual, objects of the incompetent's bounty. If the latter, they should be
able to waive their rights to equal shares of any amount properly available
for distribution to them, and consent to its distribution to the second genera-
non in any shares they desired. No one of the latter, as the recipient of not
only the bounty of his grandmother, but also of the waivers of heirs ap-
[Vol. 14":186
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intent.0' Applying these criteria, the court found:
The sum and substance of weighing these factors is to determine
whether the incompetent as a reasonably prudent aged lRdy would
make the gifts proposed so as to pass a greater share of her, estate
to her descendents. There is sufficient evidence to support, with-
out requinng, the exercise of the lower court's discretion to find
that the children and grandchildren would be the natural objects
of her bounty, that she would deem it to her advantage'to make
the gifts to effect the proposed tax savings if she could 'afford to
do so without prejudice to her own welfare, and that she would
have no hesitancy because there might be some difference-between
the shares given and the shares that would be received had the same
amount of property passed by intestacy 0 2
Cbristiansen's significance is multifold. First, it broadened the Carson
and duPont holdings by de-emphasizmg the need to duplicate existing
estate plans, indicating instead that "... . discrepancies between gift and
inheritance need not necessarily be fatal... ." 63 Second, the court enum-
erated and carefully defined the criteria the court should consider before
exercising its discretion and authorizing the distributions. Third, and
most important, the court injected the prudent man standard into the
rule of its holding.64 As noted by the court, the adoption of such an
objective standard had long been urged by interested commentators.',
parent, could be heard to complain over a discrepancy between what he
received as a gift and what he otherwise might have inherited... On the
other hand, in the absence of such consent, or intent, it would appear that
the gifts would have to go to the branches of the family in the shares in
which they would inherit.
61. Id. This requires:
... Even in the absence of a showing of former practice or conduct,
[that] there must be, .. . some showing of the relationship and intimacy
of the prospective donees with the incompetent in order to show that
they would be objects of the incompetent's bounty by any objective test.
Here again the matter is relative, and dependent on reasonable standards.
62. 56 Cal. Rptr. at 525.
63. 56 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
64. It would seem that the court is suggesting a standard of a reasonable man con-
ducting his own affairs rather than the reasonable investor standard of the trust laws.
65. See, e.g, Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Giuardians of Property, 45 Iowa L.
REv. 264, 335 (1960); Comment, 17 CALip. L. Rav. 175 (1929); 14 CoiauieL L. REv. 89
(1928); 78 Hv. L. REv. 1483 (1965); 9 UTAH L. REv. 464 (1964); 11 Vux,. L. Ray.
150 (1965). - I
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Post-Clhristiansen Era
The impact of Christiansen immediately became evident in the New
York case of In re Myles' Estate,6 6 in which the incompetent's son and
daughter petitioned the court for permission to make equal gifts to
themselves from the incompetent's estate for the purpose of reducing
the burden of excessive taxes against the estate and to permit the
enjoyment of property of the incompetent by her family during
her lifetime.67 Finding that it had the power to authorize such gifts, the
court adopted the doctrine of substitution of judgment as advanced by
Christiansen. Before adopting the Christansen view that "the testa-
mentary plan of the incompetent [is] an important but not necessarily a
determinative issue," 68 the court encountered the warnings of Carson
and acknowledged that great weight should normally be given to the
testamentary scheme of an incompetent. The incompetent's testa-
mentary intent was problematic in Myles' Estate because the will in
question specifically provided that no property should vest in the peti-
tioners unless and until they survived the testatrix-incompetent. To
resolve the apparent inconsistency between the petitioners' request and
the incompetent's testamentary scheme, the court invoked the Christian-
sen analysis which would, under the proper circumstances, allow dis-
tribution notwithstanding such restrictive conditions in the incom-
petent's will.6" Thus, New York joined the growing number of juris-
dictions following Christiansen.
In Strange v. Powers,70 a constitutional challenge was leveled against
a Massachusetts statute7i which specifically granted the Probate Court
the power to authorize the application of funds not required for the
ward's maintenance and support toward establishment of an estate plan
to minimize taxes or for gifts to likely donees. A three-pronged attack
against the statute claimed that (1) It was an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of property without due process; (2) It was an unconstitutional
delegation of power to the Probate Court, and (3) A guardian or con-
servator was not the proper recipient of such gifts.72
66. 57 Misc.2d 101, 291 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1968). Petitioners were the sole heirs
to the Myles estate, which approximated $2 million. The incompetent "donor" was 86
years of age., and the proposed gifts would have reduced the estate by one-half.
67 291 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
68. 291 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
,69. 56 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
70. 260 N.E.2d 704 (1970).
-71. .MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 422 (1969), amending ch. 201, § 38 (1958)
72. 260 N.E.2d at 707
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Drawing from duPont and Kenan for explanation of the substitution
of judgment doctrine; Monds v. Dugge13 for the decided constitution-
ality of such gifts; and Cbristiansen for support of both propositions,
the Massachusetts supreme court stated:
We agree with the modern trend of cases both in England and
in the United States. There is no reason why an individual, simply
because he happens to be a ward, should be deprived of the privi-
lege of making an intelligent common sense decision in the area
of estate planning, and in that way forced into favoring the taxing
authorities over the best interests of his estate.74
In rejecting the due process argument, the court found that the
statute provided for notice to all interested parties, and that failure to
give proper notice would preclude such action.75 To the second con-
stitutional challenge, concerning an unlawful delegation of power by
the legislature, the court concluded: "The subject of [the statute] is one
particularly within the experience and competence of the Probate Court,
which may properly be depended upon to handle the various questions
which may come before it without detailed provision .... ,t0
To the third contention, that a guardian or conservator cannot be the
recipient of such distributions, the court referred to the language of the
act itself which permits distributions to persons who would be "likely
recipients of donations from the ward."77 Thus, the court upheld the
constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute which specifically grants
power to approve gifts from the estate of an incompetent ward for the
purpose of generating tax savings and effectuating sound estate planning.
In In re Reuben Turner48 the incompetent's wife and three children
petitioned the court for an order permitting annual gifts of $3,000 in
order to reduce the impact of federal estate taxes. The petitioners al-
leged that such amounts would not be subject to federal gift taxes and
would be used to defray household and schooling expenses. The court
73. 176 Tenn. 550, 144 S.W.2d 761 (1940). The court said: "Since in a case of this
sort the court acts in the incompetent's stead, an appropriation of the incompetent's
estate is equivalent to a voluntary appropriation of that estate by a person of sound.
mind. Such an appropriation, as though voluntary, is not a taking of property con-
trary-to the constitutional provisions named." 144 S.W.2d at 763.
74. 260 NE.2d at 709.
75. 260 N.E.2d at 711.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 61 Misc. 2d 153, 305 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1969).
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noted its jurisdictional basis and power to authorize such allowances,"9
and then stated:
[T] he factors deemed determinative in the cases discussing the
gift versus estate tax problem are: (1) the extent of the incom-
petent's estate; (2) medical testimony- (i) regarding the perma-
nency of the incompetent's illness and his chances of recovery,
(ii) concermng the needs of the incompetent for the balance of
his illness, (iii) relating to the life expectancy of the incompetent;
(3) the gift giving disposition of the incompetent prior to his ill-
ness; (4) the testamentary scheme provided by the incompetent;
and (5) the tax consequences of the gifts. Furthermore, at least one
court in this State has permitted a gift to be made to a next of kin
solely on the ground that tax advantages would accrue to the estate
of the incompetent [In re Carson]. 80
The evidence in Turner tended to prove that the principal of the
incompetent's estate was insufficient to generate enough income to
meet the annual expenses of the incompetent and his family so that
some annual depletion of principal was necessary The evidence also
indicated that the incompetent manifested an intent to postpone distri-
bution of his children's share in his estate until their twenty-fifth birth-
day, and that the incompetent's life expectancy was unknown.s' Ap-
plying its previously-enumerated criteria to the evidence, the court con-
cluded that the petitioners failed to establish "by a fair preponderance
of the evidence that the incompetent, were he prudent and of sound
mind, would make these gifts despite the tax advantages to the ultimate
beneficiaries." 82
The Turner holding is significant for two reasons. First, the court
incorporated "prudent" into the substitution of judgment test, thereby
aligning itself with the Christiansen rationale. Second, it would seem
that "fair preponderance of the evidence" means weighing the evidence
in the light of each of the criteria separately, rather than a mathematical
weighing wherein the satisfaction of a majority of the criteria would
be sufficient to support making of gifts under the doctrine.
The recent New Hampshire case of In re Morris3 dealt with the
79. 305 N.Y.S2d at 389.
S0. Id. at 390.
:81. Id. at 387
S2. Id. at 391 (emphasis supplied).
83. 281 A.2d 156 (1971).
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same question-whether a probate court is empowered to permit gifts
by a guardian from the principal of a ward's estate for the purpose of
relieving excessive estate tax burdens. The guardian sought permission
to make equal gifts to each of the ward's four children. As in Christian-
sen, the ward had not drawn a will which could have been used to aid
the court in determining his intent.
The New Hampshire court adopted the reasoning of Strange and
Christiansen and held:
We think that the portion of [the statute] imposing a duty on
the guardian to devote the estate's income to maintenance of the
ward and his family does not prohibit him from making other
prudent and sound expenditures. On the contrary, the portion of
the statute directing him to improve the estate "frugally and with-
out waste" implies the power to make gifts which will prevent
waste of the estate's assets.8 4
MODEL LEGISLATION: UNIFoRv PROBATE CODE
The Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.)" 5 is a comprehensive statute
which seeks "... to simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs
of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors and incapaci-
tated persons." 86 Article V of the Code, entitled "Protection of Persons
under Disability and Their Property," divides the area along functional
lines. Two subdivisions are devoted exclusively to guardians of in-
capacitated persons and the protection of the incompetent's property.81
The most fundamental distinction made by the U.P.C. is the separate
treatment given care of the person and management of his property.
Under the Code, from a definitional'and functional standpoint, guardians
deal with the care and custody of the person,88 while conservators are
charged with the management of the property.8 9 Appointments of
guardians and conservators therefore normally arise in separate factual
84. 281 A.2d at 158. The court reversed a lower court decision and remanded the
case for disposition consistent with Christiansen.
85. The official text and comments were approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Unif6rm State Laws and by the American Bar Association in August,.
1969. Although not adopted by any state, the Uniform Probate Code [hereinafter
cited as U.P.C.] was cited as authority by In re Morris, 281 A.2d 156, 157 (N.H. 1971.
86. U.P.C. § 1-102(b) (1).
87. U.P.C., Art. V, General Comment. Part 3 is devoted to guardians of incapacitated
persons; Part 4 deals with protection of their property.
88. U.P.C. §S 5-312(a) (1), -304, Comment.
89. U.P.C. §9 1-102(b), 5-401.
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contexts,90 although both inquiries may be joined in the same court pro-
ceeding" The procedure for determining incapacity 2 and appointing a
guardian is governed by section 5-303. The powers of a guardian are
enumerated in section 5-312, with different limitations expressly ap-
plicable when there is also a conservator. 3 Where there is also a con-
servator, the guardian's powers vis 'a vis the ward's property are under-
standably limited to those necessary for the support, care, and educa-
non of the ward.94 This scheme represents an important departure
from the current state of the law, in which a guardian frequently is
responsible for both the care of the person and conservation of his
property.
Protective proceedings, controlled by section 5-401 are a separate
inquiry from guardianship proceedings, and thus may be instituted
with or without a corresponding guardianship. Section 5-408 enumerates
the powers of the court which may be exercised either "directly or
through a conservator, in respect to the estate and affairs of protected
persons."
The question whether a gift may be made from the ward's assets for
the purpose of reducing estate taxes is answered in section 5-408(3),
which states: "[T] he Court has, for the benefit of the person and mem-
bers of his household, all the powers over his estate and affairs which
he could exercise if present and not under disability, except the power
to make a will. These powers include, but are not limited to power to
make gifts, . . ." In the Comment to this section the drafters state that
the supervising court is given all the powers which the individual would
have if he were of full capacity. The general duty of the conservator
is ".. to act as a fiduciary and.., observe the standards of care ap-
plicable to trustees as described by § 7-302." 11 That standard is one
which ".... would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the
property of another . . "
90. U.P.C. § 5-303 (Procedure for Court Appointment of Guardian of an Incompe-
tent), § 5-401 (Protective Proceedings).
91. U.P.C. § 5-102(b).
92. "Incapacitated person" as defined by section 5-101(1) means " . any person
who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or dis-
ability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause (except
mnority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning his person;
93. U.P.C. §§ 5-312(4), (6).
94. UP.C. §§ 5-312(a) (1)-(6).
95. U.P.C. § 5-417
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Additionally,
If the estate is ample to provide for the purposes implicit in the
distributions authorized by the preceding subsections, a conserva-
tor for a protected person other than a minor has power to make
gifts to charity and other objects as the protected person might
have been expected to make, in amounts which do not exceed in
total for any year 20 percent of the income of the estate.96
A final duty of both the conservator and the court when managing
the protected person's property is that they "should take into account
-any known estate plan of the protected person, including his will, any
revocable trust of which he is settlor, and any contract, transfer or
joint ownership arrangement with provisions for payment or transfer
of benefits or interests at us death to another or others which he may
have originated." 97
Clearly, the Uniform Probate Code affirms the principles of the Whit-
bread-Carson-Cbristiansen line of cases. A substitution of judicial judg-
ment for that of the incompetent is implicit in the power of the courts
to dispose of the incompetent's estate as discussed in those cases. The
Code adopts a prudent man standard for conservators, thereby rejecting
constrictive guardianship standards which now exist. It promotes real-
istic management of the protected person's property for his benefit and
that of his family, in accordance with sound principles of estate planning
.and his manifested intent.
CONCLUSION
In the past decade the thesis question of this Note has elicited affirma-
tions from seven jurisdictions98 and denial from one.99 Striking similari-
ties appear frequently in the litigation of these questions; most com-
monly, the cases concern a moderately wealthy individual who has
become incapacitated before arrangements were made for a satisfac-
96. U.P.C. 5 5-425 (b).
97. U.P.C. 5 5-427.
98. In re Christansen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Ct. App. 1967); In re
duPont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (Ch. 1963); Strange v. Powers, 260 N.E.2d
704 (N.H. 1970); In re Moms, 281 A.2d 156 (N.H. 1971); In re Rueben Turner,
61 Misc. 2d 153, 305 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1969); In re Myles' Estate, 57 Misc.
2d 101, 291 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1968); In re Carson, 39 Misc.2d 544, 241 N.Y.S.2d
-288 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1962)- In re Kenan 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964); In re Grotfs
Estate, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 556 (Orphan's Ct. Montg. County 1965).
99. In re Estate of Neal, 406 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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tory estate plan.' 0 Since large estates frequently are involved, tax im-
plications are central to a viable disposition of the ward's property.
Recognizing this, zealous guardians, conservators and beneficiaries have
petitioned the courts to alleviate excessive tax burdens in a manner that
would be consistent with the ward's own desires. The courts are di-
vided between their duty to oversee the care of the incompetent's per-
son and the conservation of his estate. They have strained to effectuate
both.
The answer in several jurisdictions has been to resurrect the common
law doctrine of substitution of judgment enunciated by Whitbread.
Because of the courts' duty to protect and conserve the incompetent's
estate, it became necessary to formulate nmmum criteria to determine
appropriate instances for the exercise of judicial judgment in substi-
tution for that of the ward. Christiansen seems to have provided these
standards. While Christiansen and other cases have formulated a work-
able tool for the implementation of sound estate planning for incompe-
tents, the potential value of the Uniform Probate Code cannot be over-
stated. Legislative action could miminuze the possibility of confusion
concerning the wisdom of Whitbread and Christiansen, and a widespread
adoption of the Code would have the desired effect of creating a uni-
form body of interpretive law which would be available to all courts
charged with the responsibility of handling this delicate problem. In
a time when tax considerations often are controlling in estate planning,
the need to provide incompetents with the same alternatives available to
competent persons is clear. It is also evident that gifts provide a viable
means of effectuating a testamentary scheme while avoiding excessive
tax burdens and expenses of admimstration. As long as this situation
prevails, it is imperative that incompetents and their families be per-
nutted to benefit from such alternatives to the same extent other families
do. Indeed, court supervision would be seriously deficient if substitution
of judgment were restricted to pre-Christiansen standards. The preser-
vation of the doctrine through adoption of the Uniform Probate Code
merits serious consideration.
100. See, e.g., In re Chrstiansen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Ct. App.
1967), where no estate plan had been drawn before incapacity For an example of
incapacity occurring before implementation of the estate plan, see In re duPont, 41
Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (Ch. 1963).
